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As with military assistance, the United 
States has often threatened to withhold eco-
nomic aid in retaliation for all manner of bad 
behavior. These warnings have fallen on deaf 
ears, though, in large part because Islamabad 
is secure in the belief that the United States 
would not risk any action that might trigger 
Pakistan’s economic collapse – and subse-
quent loss of control over the country’s nu-
clear arsenal to terrorists or to an overtly hos-
tile government. 
Such a collapse is not out of the question: 
the Pakistani economy is in terrible shape, es-
pecially when contrasted with its potential. 
While the economy did grow at a fairly rapid 
clip through much of the past decade on the 
strength of buoyant textile exports, per capita 
income measured in terms of purchasing 
power is still a miserable $2,500 – less than 
that of Yemen or Nicaragua. Officially mea-
sured unemployment hovers around 15 per-
cent, and is probably much higher in reality 
since millions of Pakistanis eke out a living as 
part-time day laborers. The military absorbs 
a formidable chunk of the government bud-
get, and corruption siphons off a hefty piece 
of the rest, starving services ranging from ed-
ucation to health care. One sadly indicative 
statistic: 62 out of every 1,000 infants die at 
birth, about the same proportion as in 
Uganda or Laos. 
But economic aid isn’t the Atlas holding 
up Pakistan’s world. In fact, the evidence sug-
gests that foreign aid may actually be under-
mining economic progress. A recent analysis 
by Pakistani economists Muhammad Abdul 
Wahab and Vaqar Ahmed concludes that 40 
years of foreign assistance has been wasted. 
Worse, it has played the role of chewing gum 
and bailing wire to sustain bad-business-as-
usual, insulating the government and mili-
tary from any sense of urgency about eco-
nomic reform. Why even try to buck the 
that U.S. aid to Pakistan has 
failed to meet its political objectives – that the $20 billion given to this strategically 
critical country since 9/11 has generated little goodwill for the United States or coop-
eration in the war in Afghanistan. What may surprise, though, is that aid targeted at 
improving Pakistan’s economy has also been a bust, perhaps even reducing the pace 
of development. Indeed, geostrategic considerations have willfully blinded us to the 
hard-won lesson that economic aid that is not carefully targeted on bottom-up pro-
grams in failed states like Pakistan is likely to be counterproductive. 
It’s hardly a secret
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generals, secret police, landowners and senior 
bureaucrats if the United States – and now 
China – could be counted on to rescue the 
Pakistani government from policy errors, po-
litical inertia and natural disasters?
Reform pledges emerge from Islamabad 
with dreary regularity, only to die when the 
money delivered in return is used up. The lat-
est, made in 2008 as the quid pro quo for a 
three-year, $11.3 billion bailout from the IMF 
to contain inflation and currency deprecia-
tion, has fared no better than earlier ones. In 
the past four years, the government has run 
through four finance ministers, three central 
bank governors and four finance secretaries, 
none of whom apparently could convince 
powerful interests to mend their ways. As 
Shahid Javed Burki, a former World Bank 
vice-president who served as a caretaker fi-
nance minister in the 1990s, notes, “even the 
economic elite – the owners of assets in in-
dustry, agriculture, commerce and finance – 
felt that growth was not necessary since their 
interests were well served by the way the 
economy was operating.”
Although some reforms have been under-
taken to broaden the tax base and increase 
transparency, Pakistan’s tax system remains 
complex and inefficient. Its judicial system is 
both overburdened and corrupt, and suffers 
from poor security. Restrictions on foreign 
investment and state involvement in the 
economy remain serious drags on economic 
dynamism. No surprise, then, that Pakistan 
scored 123rd out of 183 countries on the 2011 
Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom — worse than it did in 1995. 
If economic aid has actually hindered 
growth and, at best, bought donors little in 
political or military terms, could one imagine 
circumstances in which it would make sense? 
Conceivably.
World Bank research on “fragile states” in 
Africa – “fragile” is a Bank euphemism for 
“failed” – suggests that aid carefully targeted at 
building the institutions that buttress market 
economies (property rights, rule of law and 
the like) can make a difference. It’s unclear, 
though, whether the United States, whose pri-
orities in Pakistan are military and political, 
is up to the challenge. 
Current U.S economic assistance to Paki-
stan is largely top-down and shifts from one 
set of objectives to the next along with geopo-
litical considerations. 
What’s needed is a more consistent, bottom- 
up approach – one, ironically, that’s already 
been spelled out in the almost-independent 
Pakistani Planning Commission’s own New 
Growth Framework. The Framework pro-
poses that the country move toward radically 
freer markets, giving the country’s ample 
population of entrepreneurs room to shed the 
baggage of greedy bureaucracies and incum-
bent monopolists. Of course, there’s an ele-
ment of naiveté here. While the plan certainly 
looks good on paper, why would domestic 
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stakeholders allow it to be implemented? 
Why, indeed. 
But that’s not a good enough reason to 
abandon what leverage the United States and 
the multilateral lenders have to make reform 
a bit more realistic option. A first step would 
be suspension of U.S. economic aid, which 
might provide the shock needed to spur the 
Pakistani government to make promises (al-
beit unenforceable ones) to implement the 
Framework. If Islamabad at least went 
through the motions, the United States might 
then substitute carrots for the stick by under-
writing some of the costs of the program 
through contributions to the World Bank’s 
ongoing aid efforts in Pakistan. The Bank, 
unlike the United States, has the proven abil-
ity to monitor how the money is spent – and 
some willingness to risk the wrath of the nice 
folks in Islamabad who prosper even as Paki-
stan doesn’t.
There have always been plausible reasons 
not to try a tough-love approach, and surely 
the same rationalizations for taking the path 
of least resistance would surface if we got se-
rious about Pakistani economic development 
now. But maybe the time has come to recog-
nize that hitting our heads against Pakistan’s 
iron wall of greed and paranoia is pointless. 
Besides, it would feel so good to stop. m
